2001-2005 ADA and Supreme Court Issues
by Kathy Hagen
The first ten years
of instruction from the Supreme Court on the ADA centered around
employment issues, most of them regarding the definition of disability.
This last five years, from 2001-2005, have included some holdings
that still define disability, but has included an expansion to
issues of state immunity regarding monetary damages in lawsuits
filed by state employees. Also, there have been some forays into
Titles II and III of the ADA with decisions instructing us on the
Supreme Court’s views. While a couple of cases have
been wins for plaintiffs, the majority have been disappointments
for Plaintiffs eroding, from a Plaintiff’s point of view, the
rights promised to disabled persons by the Congress’ passage
of the ADA.
Employment
U of Alabama Board of trustees
vs. Garrett, 2001
The Supreme Court struck
the first big blow of the past five years in the Garrett case.
Readers will remember that in this case there were two university
employees who were terminated, they alleged discriminatorily, after
they became disabled. Alabama argued that while Congress may have
meant to authorize an exemption to state immunity of federal lawsuits
with the ADA’s language, Congress didn’t have
that authority. Thus, the court held that state employees may not
sue a state in federal court for monetary damages. This case, along
with several others involving different civil rights statutes, has
eroded any possibility for state employees to receive monetary damages.
A state employee may still file for prospective relief, and they
can file against state officials in their individual capacity as
representing the state.
Williams vs. Toyota Manufacturing Co., 2002
In this case, the plaintiff,
an assembler who became disabled with carpel tunnel syndrome and
could no longer perform her job, filed a complaint that she was
disabled because she could not perform “a
class of manual tasks” thus substantially limiting a major
life activity under the ADA. The Supreme Court held that “manual
tasks” indeed might be classified as a major life activity,
but Williams didn’t meet the burden of showing that her work
as an assembler constituted a major life activity that most people
in the population would have to perform. In other words, most people
didn’t have to perform assembly work. A plaintiff would have
to argue that they couldn’t perform ordinary tasks like housework,
dressing, gardening, etc. in order for it to be considered an ordinary
manual task that people would perform as a major life activity.
Barnett vs. U.S. Airways, 2002
Here the court took
a look at reasonable accommodation as it relates to a company seniority
roster of jobs. Mr. Barnett became disabled and could not perform
his work. He was able to bid on a job that was easier because he
had the seniority. He held it until someone else with more seniority,
not disabled, outbid him for it. The plaintiff asked that, as a
reasonable accommodation, he remain in the job. The Supreme Court
held that a company does not have to allow someone to retain a
job that is part of their seniority-rated jobs, as a reasonable
accommodation. The court came to this decision despite the fact
that this particular job was not based on a collective bargaining
agreement, but on a unilateral decision by the company regarding
what jobs would be considered senior jobs. This decision is troubling
as it would seem to indicate that a company could avoid accommodating
a disabled employee simply by making easier jobs more senior jobs.
The court did advise, however, that if there were enough loopholes
in how the seniority system was applied, if there were other ways
in which a job could be taken out of that seniority roster, then
a company couldn’t maintain the fiction that this job was not
available for transfer to someone as a reasonable accommodation.
Chevron vs. Echazabal, 2002
Readers will remember
that this was the case where a contract employee did maintenance
work for 20 years for Chevron. Then, when he applied to be a Chevron
employee on staff doing the same work, he was given a medical exam.
When it was found that he had asymptomatic hepatitis C, he was
not hired, and terminated from the contract as well. The issue
in this case was whether the court in deciding this case should
be instructed by the statutory language in the employment provisions
of the ADA or the regulatory language promulgated by EEOC. The statutory
language indicates that a “direct threat” is only available
if there is a direct threat to other employees. The EEOC regulations,
promulgated on the employment provisions, indicated that a “direct
threat” in addition to concerning a direct threat to others,
could also take into consideration a direct threat to the employee
himself. The company argued that the EEOC definition, rather than
the statutory definition, should be used. Chevron argued that the
toxic chemicals Echazabal would be exposed to could have a damaging
effect on his liver, and he should not be hired, as the company would
then be liable for his injuries. Of course, he would have been performing
the exact same job he had already performed for 20 years. Also, the
Supreme Court had decided in other cases that EEOC had overstepped
its boundaries by promulgating regulations that went beyond the statutory
language. However, in this case, the Court held that EEOCs regulations
governed. Also, Chevron could refuse to hire the plaintiff based
on a business necessity of trying to alleviate liability.
EEOC vs. Wafflehouse, 2002
Here was the only good
decision for employees in the Supreme Court cases in 2002. This
case involved an employee who had signed, as a condition of employment,
an agreement to arbitrate any issues rather than sue. He filed
a complaint with EEOC after he was terminated, and EEOC ended up
filing a lawsuit on this matter against Waffle-house. The Supreme
Court held that EEOC was not a party to the employee’s
agreement for binding arbitration, and that EEOC could sue as a third
party, and could also ask for damages for the employee.
Title II Cases Involving Public
Agencies
Barnes vs. Gorman, 2002
This was the case regarding the person who was quadriplegic and
used a wheelchair, who was ordered out of a bar for disorderly conduct
and carried to the police station in an inaccessible police car which
caused permanent lasting injury. The jury in the district court case
awarded him a million dollars in actual damages, and 1.2 million
in punitive damages. The Supreme Court ultimately held that punitive
damages are not available to plaintiffs in Title II cases. But here,
at least, Mr. Gorman got the original million-dollar jury verdict
for actual damages.
Tenessee vs. Lane, 2004
Here, the Supreme Court took up the issue of whether a state was
immune from lawsuits for money damages brought under Title II of
the ADA, in the same way as it had decided states were immune from
money damage suits under Title I of the ADA.
Readers will remember that this was the case where persons with
disabilities who used wheelchairs were denied dignified access to
courthouses without being carried in. Here the Supreme Court finally
came through and found that, when the issue involves a fundamental
right, such as availing oneself of the services provided by a courthouse,
or when a party or a witness to a case, a plaintiff could seek monetary
damages for denial of access as a fundamental right. Future cases
will involve whether or not the Supreme Court is willing to expand
this right beyond making courthouses accessible.
Goodman vs. Georgia, 2005
This is a case that
the Supreme Court has just accepted for review and will not be
argued until next term, 2005-2006. This case involves whether or
not a court will expand the exemption to state immunity against
Title II lawsuits for a prisoner who is paraplegic and uses a wheelchair.
The facts seem to be that the prison in which the plaintiff is
held keeps him in isolation for 23 out of 24 hours a day. The cell
isn’t even wide enough for him to turn around in when
using his wheelchair, and showers and toilets are not accessible.
The U.S. has intervened on the side of the plaintiff in this case.
We’ll have to wait until next year to see what happens in this
case. Will accessible prison cells rise to the level of a fundamental
right for purposes of a monetary damages provision in a Title II
lawsuit under the ADA?
Public Accommodation Cases
The Supreme Court has decided
two cases that involve issues under Title III of the ADA, dealing
with public accommodations/private businesses.
Martin vs. PGA, 2001
In this case involving
the professional amateur golfer, Casey Martin, the court first
held that a sports facility needs to be accessible, not only to
spectators, but in certain cases to participants as well. This
particular case, as readers will remember, involved Casey Martin,
with serious physical impairments, which wanted to use a golf cart
during the final prong of the PGA competition-the only prong in which
golf carts were not allowed. The court determined that in this case
allowing a golfer to use a cart did not constitute a substantial
alteration to the program. In other words, it didn’t give Martin
an advantage over other golfers because, as the court stated, even
using a cart, Martin is in more pain and discomfort and has more
difficulty than a walking golfer in competing. This is a narrow ruling
but a significant one because it holds out hope that other persons
with disabilities might be able to participate in sports, as well
as be a spectator at sporting events.
Spector vs. Norwegian Cruise Lines, 2005
This case ultimately holds
that cruise lines, even foreign-based ones, do not escape coverage
under Title III of the ADA even though cruise lines were not one
of the specific businesses listed under the definition of public
accommodations. At this point, the court seems to be hinting that
such coverage may not extend to requiring cruise lines, (either foreign-based
or domestic) to remove architectural barriers. Hopefully, a more
enlightened court can re-visit this issue at some time.
Conclusion
The full account of
most of these cases can be found by looking at back issues of Access
Press on their web site, www.accesspress.org, from 2002 to date.
What happens next at the Supreme Court level depends greatly on
whether or not a current justice retires and our current president
has the opportunity to appoint someone else. If that happens during
our current administration, the appointment may well be someone
on the most conservative end of the spectrum. Remember that President
Bush has said that he believes someone like Justices Thomas or Scalia
would be the best appointees. They are the most conservative justices.
The rumors that Chief Justice Rehnquist (on the conservative side)
would step down. That hasn’t happened as yet. If he steps down,
not only will the administration be able to appoint another justice,
even more conservative than Chief Justice Rehnquist, but this administration
would be able to appoint the next chief justice. We’ll all
need to pay close attention to the Supreme Court and its makeup in
the next few years.
Editor's Note: Sandra Day O'Connor, the first woman to sit on the
Supreme Court and a crucial swing vote on divisive social issues
such as abortion, is retiring. She is 75 years old.
